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ABSTRACT
Separation between owner and manager in the lodging 
industry may cause a conflict of the interests between them. 
An investigation was conducted to determine the relationship 
between managerial ownership and performance in the lodging 
industry and to further determine whether this relationship 
differ across the two sectors, regular hotels and casino 
hotels, in the lodging industry.
Statistical tests, using regression, revealed size 
adjusted managers' ownership percentage had a significant 
relationship with hotels performance in terms of operational 
and managerial activities and shareholder's relevance, such 
as profit margin, hotels operating return and hotels return 
on equity. Performance measured by these ratios is 
positively, linearly related to managers' ownership. 
Furthermore, the results of profit margin and operating 
return did show significant difference between different 
ownership levels. The findings also indicated that 
managers' ownership may be a more effective tool in 
interests alignment for regular hotels than for casino 
hotels.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1
IN TR O D U C TIO N
Background and Purpose of the Study
The relationship between stockholders and management is 
an agency relationship. Such a relationship exists whenever 
someone (the principal) hires another (the agent) to 
represent her/his interests. Since there is no perfect 
agency contract that can guarantee that managers act to 
maximize the principle's interest, conflict of interests 
between the principal and agent may arise. The conflict 
between managers and stockholders is called an agency 
problem that prevails in corporations when management and 
ownership are separated. The principal can limit divergence 
from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for 
the agent(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is, however, 
generally impossible for the principal at zero cost to 
ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the 
principal's viewpoint. This cost stemming from agency 
relationship is termed as agency cost.
The traditional pattern of the hotel industry made up of 
individually owned hotels has been changing in many
1
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countries to resemble more closely to manufacturing 
industries. With a number of companies going public as 
modern corporations, sometimes managers are hired as agents 
for hotel owners under management contracts, which provide 
for the payment of expenses, management fees and/or sharing 
of profits. This might cause agency problem in the same way 
as in other industries.
The goal of a lodging company is to maximize its 
owners' or the shareholders' wealth (Andrew and Schmidgall, 
1993). To achieve this goal, the company must maximize its 
revenue by providing customers with satisfactory services 
and products while minimizing its cost. When managers 
operate hotels as agents, the objectives of management may 
differ from those of stockholders. In a large corporation, 
the stocks may be so widely held that stockholders cannot 
even make known their objectives, much less control or 
influence management. This situation allows management to 
act in its own best interests rather than those of the 
stockholders. The conflict of interests between hotel 
managers and shareholders is an important cause of the slide 
in the lodging industry in the 1980s (Trice, 1992).
Stockholders hope that managers as their agents will 
act in their best interests, and delegate decision-making
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
authority to them. Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the 
first to develop a comprehensive theory of the firm under 
the agency/owner framework. They show that the principals 
(stockholders) can assure themselves that the agent 
(management) will make optimal decisions only if appropriate 
incentives are given and only if the agent is monitored. 
Incentives include stock options, bonuses, and perquisites, 
and they are directly related to how close management 
decisions come to the interests of stockholders. Monitoring 
can be done by bonding the agent, systematically reviewing 
management perquisites, auditing financial statements, and 
explicitly limiting management decisions. These monitoring 
activities necessarily involve costs, or agency costs as an 
inevitable result of the separation of ownership and control 
of a corporation.
To reduce agency costs, one way is to increase 
managers' common stock ownership in the firm, so managers 
can better align their interests with those of stockholders. 
The less the ownership percentage of the managers, the less 
the likelihood that they will behave in a manner consistent 
with maximizing shareholder wealth, and the greater the need 
for outside stockholders to monitor their activities.
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Throughout the 1980s, there was an increasing 
separation between management and ownership in the lodging 
industry (Trice,1992). Management made decisions that were 
good for management, including the enhancement of a chain 
label, pursuing managerial power by overbuilding hotels to 
cause oversupply in the 1980s. Those decisions were not 
always in the best interests of ownership. A large number 
of hotels were developed and syndicated with the primary 
objectives of producing development fees and management fees 
with no on-going balance sheet liabilities. Return to the 
investor was a secondary objective here. Somewhere along 
the way, managers almost forgot the interests of ownership. 
This separation of decision-making and risk-bearing function 
also caused agency conflicts, and, therefore, may have 
raised the agency costs.
Therefore it is important to investigate the role of 
managers' stock ownership in limiting agency conflicts and 
maximizing the stockholders' wealth in the lodging industry. 
It is also necessary to determine the relationship between 
managers' stock ownership and lodging corporations' 
financial performance.
Thus far, research on the relationship between 
managers' stock ownership and firm performance has yielded
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
inconclusive results. Some studies (Kim, Lee, and Francis, 
1988; Hudson, Jahera and Lloyd, 1992) showed that there was 
a significantly positive relationship between managers' 
common stock ownership and firm performance, while some 
studies failed to discover a relationship between them 
(Demesetz, 1983; Lloyd, Jahera, and Goldstein, 1986; 
Tsetsekos and Defusco, 1990). Other studies concluded that 
stock ownership did not have the same effect on firm 
performance in low-growth industries and high-growth 
industries( Kesner, 1987). Still other researchers (Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988) found a significant nonmonotonic 
relationship between managers' stock ownership and firm 
performance.
There are a number of problems inherent in previous 
ownership/performance relationship studies which may explain 
the inconclusive results. First, some studies (Lloyd,
Jahera and Golddtein, 1986) used multi-industry samples 
instead of investigating a single industry. Since industry- 
specific effects were not controlled for, their results 
could be distorted. Second, some studies have used a single 
measure of performance, either accounting or market measure 
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988) instead of using both 
measures.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The purpose of this study is to examine the 
relationship between managers' common stock ownership and 
financial performance of firms, using only the lodging 
industry data. To date, no study on the managers' common 
stock ownership and performance relationship has been 
conducted for the lodging industry. This study will 
investigate such relationship in the lodging industry. The 
results of this study will reveal whether and how managers' 
stock ownership may lead to improved hotels financial 
performance.
This study will be different from previous studies in 
the following ways. First, the focus of this study will be 
on a single industry, i.e. the lodging industry, in order to 
avoid inter-industries effects. Second, this study will use 
a set of accounting measures of performance, such as return 
on assets, return on equity, return on investment, operating 
return and profit margin, and a market measure, stock 
return, and compare the results of different measures.
Third, this study will use size-adjusted managers' ownership 
percentage instead of directly using ownership percentage. 
Size effect through ownership was found in previous 
empirical studies. The managers in companies with different 
sizes (measured by market value of shareholders' equity)
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were found to have different levels of incentive even 
though the manager ownership percentage were the same.
This study will separate regular hotels and casino 
hotels to examine if the ownership and performance 
relationship is different in the sectors. Casino hotels are 
a special sector in the lodging industry. They have many 
features different from regular hotels. Casino hotels' 
profits come mainly from gaming operation, rather than room 
operation. Besides, they belong to the fast-growth sector 
while regular hotels are in the slow-growth sector of the 
lodging industry.
Recently the lodging industry is experiencing a strong 
recovery after a long downward slide since the 1980s. To 
prevent the 1980s' problem from reoccurring, separation 
between management and ownership of hotels as one of the 
important causes of the slide in the 1980s still needs to be 
investigated (Trice, 1992). How to better align the 
interests of decision-making managers with those of risk- 
bearing shareholders in the further needs to be explored in 
the lodging industry. Since no previous study on managers' 
common stock ownership and performance has been documented 
in the hospitality industry, this study attempts to extend 
previous research on managers' stock ownership and
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performance relationship into the lodging industry. By 
choosing the lodging industry to investigate the managers' 
ownership/performance relationship, this study hopefully 
will enable researchers, stockholders and managers in the 
hospitality industry to determine if increasing managers' 
stock ownership can better align the interests between 
managers and stockholders, and therefore may provide some 
clues for enhancing the hotel performance in the days to 
come.
Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to investigate if the 
managers' ownership can improve hotel performance. Research 
questions related to the purpose include:
1. Is there a significant relationship between 
managers' ownership and hotel performance? If there 
is a significant relationship, how performance is 
related to managers' ownership?
2. If managers' ownership does have an impact on 
performance, does the impact differ across the slow- 
growing hotel sector and the fast-growing casino 
sector? Is managers' ownership more effective in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
owner/manager interests alignment in one sector than 
in the other sector?
Finding the answers to these questions could assist in 
reducing the interest conflict between managers and 
shareholders, and hence lead to lower agency cost and better 
performance.
Potential Contributions of Study
The potential contribution of this study to the 
hospitality industry and agency theory research are:
1. Finance theory states that managers' ownership 
affects firm's performance. Many lodging companies 
have practice in managers' common stock ownership. 
Research on the hotel managerial stock ownership, 
however, has not been documented. This research 
will be an exploratory study that extends previous 
research on other industries into the lodging 
industry.
2. Most of the previous empirical studies of managers' 
common stock ownership used a single measure, either 
accounting or market measure. This study will use 
both and compare the results.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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3 . Previous empirical studies on the managerial
ownership /performance relationship used data mainly 
from manufacturing industries. By using the data 
from the lodging industry, a major service industry 
in the United States, this study could provide 
important additional empirical evidence for the 
agency theory.
4. Previous studies used the managers stock percentage 
as a measure of ownership, without any adjustment. 
This study uses managerial stock percentage adjusted 
by firm size as the measure of ownership.
Therefore, the size impact will be controlled.
5. Previous studies have found that, for both slow- 
growing industries and fast-growing industries, 
stock ownership do not appear to influence 
performance in the same way. Since within the 
lodging industry, regular hotels are a slow-growing 
sector whereas casino hotels are a fast-growing 
sector. This study will investigate the impact of 
growth within a service industry.
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Delimitation of Study
This study will investigate publicly traded lodging 
corporations. Those corporations are further divided into 
two sectors: regular hotels and casino hotels. Those 
companies with a small scale hotel operation but a large 
scale of other industrial operations are not covered in the 
study. Casino equipment, software development companies are 
not included in the study. Riverboat casino companies are 
not a part of the study, since they don't provide 
accommodations. In this study, managers' ownership refers 
to shares held by officers and directors at the corporate 
level. Ownership by lower levels of managers is not treated 
as managerial ownership.
Organization of the Study
This study is composed of five chapters. Chapter 1 
provides a background of the study, including the problem 
statement and objectives. Specific research questions are 
presented and terms defined. Chapter 2 reviews the agency 
theory and empirical studies on the relationship between 
managers' common stock ownership and performance. Chapter 3 
is a discussion of the research methodology. Chapter 4 
analyzes the data and the statistical results of hypotheses
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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testing. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the studies and 
provides recommendations for further research.
Definition of the Terms
The following is a list of the definitions of some 
specific terms used in this research study:
Financial Performance; It refers to a firm's accounting 
profitability such as Return on Assets (ROA), and 
Return on Equity (ROE), as well as a firm's market 
performance or stock return.
Return On Assets: Return on assets measures the firm's
ability to utilize its assets to create profits. It is 
the return on total investment. It is calculated as 
the net income after taxes divided by total assets. 
Return on Equity: This is another profitability ratio that 
relates profits to investments. It is expressed as net 
income after taxes minus preferred stock dividend then 
divided by common shareholders' equity. It is the 
return to owners' equity.
Profit Margin; Profit margin is a profitability ratio
focusing on activity, which is calculated as net income 
divided by total sales.
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Return on Investment; Return on investment measures the
relationship between the income earned and the capital 
invested. It is calculated as net income divided by- 
average long-term liabilities plus equity.
Operating Return: It is the ratio of operating cash flow to 
total operating assets. Operating assets is defined as 
total assets minus invest & advance to subsidies.
Stock Return; is the percentage of price change in certain 
period. It is calculated as : R = (P^ -Pg) /Pg. If a 
company pays dividend, the return is R = (P^ + Dir.- Pg)/ 
Pg. In this study, it is the first nine months of 1996 
stock price change adjusted by dividends and stock 
split effect.
Casino Hotels; The hotels that house a gambling casino, 
which includes games of chance using cards, dice, and 
slot machines.
Regular Hotels; The hotels that provide accommodation and 
may operate other functions such as entertainment and 
food and beverage as business.
Firm Size Index: The log to the base 10 of the market value 
of the firms(Lnsize) is selected for calculating the 
index. The smallest Lnsize is used as the benchmark.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The size index is created by dividing each company's 
Lnsize by the benchmark.
Size Adjusted Mangers' Ownership Percentage; size adjusted 
MOP is obtained by multiplying the original MOP by the 
size index.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW  OF THE RELATED LITER A TU R E
Introduction
The previous chapter briefly discussed the background 
of the ownership and performance relationship. Research 
questions were formulated and terms defined. This chapter 
provides a detailed review of the literature.
Since the ownership and performance relationship is 
derived from agency theory. This study will first review 
the literature about the agency theory. The literature in 
this area has grown quite large. This section of review 
contains three parts. (1)three important researchers,
(2)agency theory and agency cost, and(3)solutions to agency 
problem.
The second section of the review specifically focuses 
on three parts. The first part focuses on empirical studies 
about managerial ownership/performance relationship.
Variety of methods and different results will be reviewed. 
The reasons for diverse findings will be investigated. In 
the second part, employee stock ownership plans will be
15
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reviewed as an well-known strategy of using ownership as an 
incentive to enhance corporation performance. The third 
part will review the importance of managerial ownership as 
an incentive in the hospitality industry.
The last section of the chapter is a summary of the 
review of the theory and empirical studies.
Theoretical Background  Agency Theory.
Three important researchers :
Adam Smith(1776)
Agency theory dates back to 1776, when Adam Smith 
recognized the inevitable conflicts that arise between the 
interests of owners and managers of a company in his classic 
economics book "The Wealth of Nations".
The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, 
however, being the managers rather of other people's 
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, 
that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the 
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider 
attention to small matters as not for their master's 
honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation 
from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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must always prevail, more or less, in the management of 
the affairs of such a company.
As the first person to discover the conflicts between 
the interests of owners and managers of a company, Adam 
Smith inspirited a lot of economists who later conducted 
extensive further researches in this area.
Berle and Means(1932)
The agency problem, caused by the separation of 
ownership and control in the modern corporation, is an issue 
brought to the force so effectively by Berle and 
Means(1932). It remains a central position in recent 
writings about the economic theory of the firm. The problem 
is stated succinctly by Berle and means (1932) :
The separation of ownership from control produces 
a condition where the interests of owner and of 
ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where 
many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the 
use of power disappear....
In creating these new relationships, the quasi- 
public corporation may fairly be said to work a 
revolution. It... has divided ownership into nominal 
ownership and the power formerly joined to it. Thereby 
the corporation has changed the nature of profit- 
seeking enterprise.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The holder of corporate stock experiences a loss of 
control over his resources because ownership is so broadly 
dispersed across large numbers of shareholders that the 
typical shareholder cannot exercise real power to oversee 
managerial performance in modern corporations, Management 
exercises more freedom in the use of the firm's resources 
than would exist if the firm were managed by its owner(s), 
or at least, if ownership interests were more concentrated. 
Because management and ownership interests do not naturally 
coincide when not housed in the same person, Berle and 
Means(1932) perceive a conflict of interest, which, with 
ownership dispersed, is resolved in management's favor.
When managers hold little equity in the firm and 
shareholders are too dispersed to enforce value 
maximization, corporate assets may be deployed to benefit 
managers rather than shareholders. Such managerial benefits 
can include shirking and perquisite-taking, but also 
encompass pursuit of such non-value-maximizing objectives as 
sales growth, empire building, and employee welfare.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Jensen and Meckling(1976)
This stream of research has implications for economic 
theory and policy because it examines a fundamental premise 
of classic economic theory, that the management of a firm 
does and should reflect the interests of its owners. If we 
assume a difference between the interests of owners and 
management, it follows logically that with great separation 
of control, the making of polices and decisions will not 
adequately reflect the interests of the owners. An 
important early study by Berle (195 9) concluded that 
shareholders controlled only 34 percent of the 2 00 largest 
nonfinancial corporations in the U.S.. Larner (1970) 
reported that this figure had dropped to 12 percent. Such a 
finding strikes at a core idea of classic economics because 
owners, interested in profitability, may lose control of 
their assets to management who may have different 
intentions.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) are the researchers who 
systematically developed a theory of the ownership structure 
of the firm from the theory of agency, the theory of 
property rights and the theory of finance. They define the 
concept of agency cost, show its relationship to the 
"separation and control" issue, investigate the nature of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and 
outside equity, demonstrate who bears these costs and why, 
and provide a new definition of the firm.
They defined an agency relationship as a contract under 
which one or more persons, or the principal (s) , engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent.
They defined agency costs as the sum of (1) the 
monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding 
expenditures by the agent, (3) the residual cost-- the 
dollar equivalent of the reduction in wealth experienced by 
the principal due to this divergence.
Agency.theory and Agency cost 
In its simplest form, agency theory attempts to explain 
the divergence of interests of various stakeholders in a 
company. These stakeholders include not only owners and 
managers but also creditors, employees, and suppliers. A 
corporation can be viewed as the nexus for a set of 
contracting relationships among these constituents. Agency 
theory supports understanding into the divergence of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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interests among the stakeholders of a firm and the problems 
and costs that emerge from this divergence.
Agency theory is important whenever there is separation 
of ownership and control. The principals of a organization 
are the owners or stockholder, and the agents are the 
managers who control most aspects of the organization. In 
small proprietorships, the goals and desires of management 
are one in the same with the owners since both roles are 
filled by one person. But as a company increases in size 
and complexity, the owners may become separated form the day 
to day decisions of the company. Management may act in its 
own best interest and not the interests of the owners. The 
principal can limit divergence from his interests by 
establishing appropriate incentives for agents and by 
incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the unwanted 
behavior of an agent.
Managers have a propensity to pursue their own 
interests when that conflict with those of the stockholders. 
This conflict gives rise to equity agency costs. For 
example, managers may seek to consume excessive perquisites 
at shareholders' expense, they may make short-run operating 
decisions that benefit themselves but hurt stockholders, and 
they may make operating decisions that reduce their personal
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risk despite stockholders' preferences for more corporate 
risk taking.
SolutiQng-J;.c>. Agengy. problems 
There are several ways to reduce equity agency costs. 
One way in which equity agency costs may be reduced is for 
managers to increase their common stock ownership in the 
firm, better aligning their interests with stockholders' 
interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In the extreme case 
of 100% ownership, managers can reduce equity agency costs 
to zero. However, as managers increase their ownership in 
the firm, their personal wealth becomes less diversified.
For example, to achieve 100% ownership of a large 
corporation, managers' diversification costs would become 
exorbitant, since they would have to resort to large 
personal borrowings to finance the larger outlays. Thus, 
using increased managerial stock ownership to control agency 
costs is not costless. As managers' wealth becomes more 
poorly diversified, they will require increasing amounts of 
compensation.
A second way to reduce equity agency costs is to 
increase dividends (Rozeff, 1982 and Easterbrook, 1984) . 
Paying larger dividends increases the chance that external
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equity capital will have to be raised. When new equity is 
raised, managers are monitored by the Exchanges, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, investment bankers, and 
providers of new capital. This monitoring induces managers 
who seek to retain their employment to act more in line with 
stockholders' interests. However, the use of dividends is 
not costless. When external capital is raised to pay for 
the dividends, substantial flotation costs will be paid to 
investment bankers.
A third way to reduce equity agency costs is to use 
more debt financing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Using more 
debt reduces total equity financing, reducing in turn the 
scope of the manager-stockholder conflict. However, debt 
financing introduces conflicts of interest between 
stockholders and creditors that gives rise to debt agency 
costs. One concern of bondholders is that stockholders may 
seek to expropriate their wealth by increasing their risk 
through risky corporate investment decisions, or perhaps 
through inducing unanticipated priority dilution. Myers 
(1977) points out another conflict will arise if the firm 
has discretionary investments. When managers have 
discretion over some investments, they may forgo those 
investments for which the main benefit is to increase
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bondholders' wealth rather than stockholders' wealth. Other 
more obvious debt agency costs include bankruptcy costs and 
the costs incurred as bondholders seek contractual 
protection (Smith and Warner, 1979).
A fourth way to reduce equity agency costs is to use 
institutional investors as monitoring agents (Bathala, Moon, 
and Rao, 1994). Historically, institutional investors 
dissatisfied with managerial or stock performance simply 
sold their holdings. i.e., followed an "exit" policy. 
However, this has become increasingly difficult for many 
institutions because they must accept substantial discounts 
in order to liquidate their significant holdings. Coffee
(1991) provides an insight into the changing behavior of 
institutional investors from being passive investors to 
active monitors. The institutional investors put pressure 
on corporations, sought special "institutional investor 
seat" on the board to protect their interests, or set up 
shareholder committees to monitor their financial 
performance.
Equity and debt agency costs reduce firm value. To 
reduce these costs, managers can choose the least costly 
financial policy mix, trading off the benefits and costs of 
personal stock ownership with the benefits and costs of
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paying dividends. In this way, management adopts a policy 
mix that is uniquely related to their firm's respective 
policy benefits and costs. Managers' incentive to seek the 
least-cost policy mix comes from potential increases in 
their personal wealth and from external competitive market 
forces. Insider ownership, debt and dividend policies 
might be related directly through agency theories. Three 
stakeholder groups are most relevant: firm managers, 
external shareholders, and creditors. Jenson and Meckling 
(1976) provide an analysis of the effects of agency 
conflicts among the three groups. Their analysis suggests 
that the proportion of equity controlled by insiders should 
influence the firm's policies. Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn
(1992) did research to examine the determinants of cross- 
sectional differences in insider ownership, debt, and 
dividend policies. They found the level of insider 
ownership has a negative influence on a firm's debt and 
dividend levels. Firms with a high level of insider 
ownership have a low level of debt and dividend.
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Literature on Ownership and Performance Relationship
Managers' Ownership and Performance. Relationship
Because the role of managers' common stock ownership is 
central to the Jensen and Meckling agency theory (1976), an 
increasing body of literature has indicated that managerial 
stock ownership helps in aligning managerial interests with 
those of the external stockholders.
Research focusing on the influence of ownership 
structure is plentiful. The following is a review of some 
major studies in this field.
Kim, Lee, and Francis (1988) discovered there was a 
relation between insider ownership and returns. More 
specifically, they examined a sample of 157 firms over a 
four-year period (1975-78) using size, ownership, and E/P 
determined portfolios. Their conclusions supported the 
hypothesis that there was an agency effect on performance. 
That is , returns were related to insider ownership.
Hudson, Jahera and Lloyd (1992) using piecewise 
regression model also obtained the result that there was a 
significantly positive relationship between the degree of 
insider ownership and performance.
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An interesting finding from the management literature 
is the conclusion of Salancik and Pfeffer(1980) that " the 
capital markets impose a discipline on management controlled 
firms in that tenure is related to the firm's share price 
performance."
An interesting finding from the management literature 
is the conclusion of Salancik and Pfeffer(1980) that " the 
capital markets impose a discipline on management controlled 
firms in that tenure is related to the firm's share price 
performance."
In contrast, Demsetz (1983) found that the ownership 
structure of the firm that "emerges as an endogenous outcome 
of competitive selection in which various cost advantages 
and disadvantages are balanced to arrive at an equilibrium 
organization of the firm". Accordingly, Demsetz concluded 
that there was no relation between ownership structure and 
accounting profitability.
The study by Tsetsekos and DeFusco (1990) also 
concluded that managerial ownership did not have an effect 
on market returns and that the size effect was independent 
of ownership.
An earlier work by Lloyd, Jahera, and Goldstein (1986) 
also found no significant relationship between managerial
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ownership and performance. Their performance measure was 
mean monthly portfolio return. In their study the ownership 
structure was measured by the percent of stock held by the 
largest holder. A total sample of 779 firms from the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), 
and over the counter (OTC) was included. No significant 
ownership effect was found when controlling for the size of 
the firm.
Another study by Kesner (1987) focused on the stock 
ownership of members of the board of directors for 250 of 
the Fortune 500 companies. That study showed the managerial 
ownership/performance relationship differed among different 
industries. They found that in rapid growth industries, 
managers might see a greater opportunity for increasing the 
value of their investment at a rapid pace through aligning 
their interests with other shareholders interests. This, in 
turn, might enhance organizational performance. Conversely, 
in low growth or more stable industries, managers might feel 
there was less opportunity for rapid increase of their 
returns due to the nature of the industry, and as a result, 
managerial ownership might give less incentive. Their 
empirical results indicated that, for low-growth industries, 
stock ownership did not appear to influence either current
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or future performance. Alternatively, high-growth 
industries did reveal a positive and significant 
relationship between stock ownership of the board and 
performance.
Morck, shleifer, and Vishny(1988) examined the 
relationship between management ownership and the market 
valuation for a sample of large firms. They found there was 
a significant nonmonotonic relationship between management 
ownership and market valuation of the firm, as measured by 
Tobin's Q. They concluded that Demsetz and Lehn's (1985) 
failure to find a relationship between ownership 
concentration and profitability was probably due to their 
use of a linear specification that did not capture an 
important nonmonotonicity. In Morck, Shleifer and Vishny's 
research (1988) , they estimated a variety of piecewise 
linear regressions. The results suggested a positive 
relation between ownership and Q in the 0% to 5% board 
ownership range, a negative and less pronounced relation in 
the 5% to 25% range, and a further positive relation beyond 
25%. These results were consistent with both the 
convergence-of-interests and entrenchment effects. The 
initial rise in Q as ownership rose might reflect managers' 
greater incentives to maximize value as their stakes rose.
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Beyond the 5% ownership level, however, increases in 
managerial ownership may be associated with conditions 
conducive to the entrenchment of incumbent management such 
as status as a founder, increased voting power, increased 
tenure with and attachment to the firm, lower employment of 
professional managers, and dominance of inside over outside 
directors on the board. Some form of entrenchment might 
explain the declining valuation of corporate assets as board 
ownership rose from 5% to 25%. Throughout this range, the 
incentive effect could still be operative; it was just 
dominated by the entrenchment effect. As board ownership 
reached the neighborhood of 25%, managers with even higher 
board ownership might not be significantly more entrenched 
than those with 25% ownership. With 25-30% ownership, the 
board might be effectively free to reject any outside 
challenge. The increase in Q for the very highest ownership 
levels then might reflect a pure convergence-of-interest 
effect.
McConnell and Servaes (1990) also investigated the 
relation between Tobin's Q and the structure of equity 
ownership for a sample of 1,173 firms for 1976 and 1093 
firms for 1986. They found a significant curvilinear 
relation between Q and the fraction of common stock owned by
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corporate insiders. The curve slopes upward until insider 
ownership reached approximately 40% to 50% and then slopes 
slightly down ward. The results were consistent with the 
hypothesis that corporate value was a function of the 
structure of equity ownership.
Managers' ownership percentage and firm size
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found that ownership 
concentration and firm size, measured by the market value of 
equity, are inversely related. Large firms exhibit a 
distinct separation between ownership and control. Low 
levels of managerial ownership often exist. The large 
market value of those firms and the wide dispersion of 
shareholdings mean that managers cannot hold a sizable 
percentage of shares. The more concentrated ownership 
structure of small firms may involve substantial managerial 
ownership percentage.
Tsetsekos and Defusco (1990) realized it was not 
accurate to use managers' ownership percentage as a proxy 
without controlling size effect. They explored the 
interrelationship among portfolio returns, managerial 
ownership, and size. To isolate the effect of managerial 
ownership on portfolio returns, the impact of size was
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controlled for. They held size constantly, and treated 
managerial ownership as a proxy for the convergence of 
interest between managers and shareholders, and found the 
positive significant managerial ownership/performance 
relationship.
Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and Corporate 
Escformance
ESOP is a employee benefit plan. Unlike other benefit 
plans, the employees have a chance to make a difference for 
the firm. Although many employees own stocks in a wide 
variety of other companies through their pension funds, 
there is nothing they can do to improve the financial health 
of those companies and thereby increase the value of the 
stocks in their accounts. With an ESOP, employees can work 
to improve the profitability of the company they work for 
and thereby increase the value of the stock in their 
individual accounts. Right now there are more than ten 
thousand employee stock ownership plans and over 11 million 
ESOP employee-owners. America has a healthy and growing 
employee-owner sector.
The primary purpose of ESOPs is and always has been to 
widen the ownership base of substantial capital estates. No
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other goals are mentioned in any of the legislation 
governing ESOPs. Nonetheless, many advocates of employee 
ownership predicted that one of its benefits would be to 
improve corporate performance by linking the financial 
interests of employees and companies (Mcallister and Marsh, 
1980) .
The first effort to address the issue more 
systematically was a comprehensive survey undertaken by the 
NCEO of twenty-seven hundred employees in thirty-seven ESOP 
firms (Rosen, Klein, and Young, 1991). The purpose was to 
discover whether ownership really did have an impact on 
employees' attitudes. The answer was clearly yes. The more 
stoke employees owned in their company, the more committed 
they were to the firm, the more satisfied they were with 
their work, the less likely they were to look for other 
jobs, and the more they liked being owners. The positive 
effects of ownership were magnified when active programs 
were adopted for sharing information and soliciting 
employees' input into decisions at all levels of the 
company.
According to Rosen, Klein, and Young (1991), overall, 
the ESOP firms grew 3 to 4 percent per year faster than they 
would have without the ESOP, depending on the measure used.
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Over a ten-year period, this growth would create almost 50 
percent more jobs in the ESOP companies. A closer look at 
the data showed that most of the growth occurred in the most 
participative one-third of the companies, those that allowed 
for relatively high degrees of employee input into job-level 
decision making. These firms performed 11 to 17 percent per 
year better. Participation was measured by asking managers 
to tell how much influence nonmanagement employees had over 
issues ranging from social events to corporate policy.
Firms were considered to be participative if employees at 
least had the opportunity to share decision making with 
management on issues affecting the organization and 
performance of their jobs.
One might interpret this finding to mean that it is 
participation, not ownership, that makes the difference, but 
that did not turn out to be the case. According to Rosen, 
Klein, and Young (1991), many other studies have found that 
participation alone has only an ambiguous and generally very 
short-lived impact on performance. Ownership motivates 
employees; participation gives them an opportunity to use 
this motivation to contribute their ideas, knowledge, and 
experience to help the company grow.
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This relationship between ownership, participation, and 
performance has become the conventional wisdom, backed by a 
growing number of examples from companies that have used 
this approach. Both the critics of ESOPs and most of its 
advocates agree that participative management is essential 
to assuring that employee ownership will improve corporate 
performance (Rosen and Young, 1991). The relationship 
between manager ownership and performance of the firms also 
need to be investigated, since managers are a special 
section of employee.
The _Importance of Managerial Ownership as an Incentive in 
the.üQg.pitality Industry
A survey of general managers of more than 80 four- and 
five star hotels in the United States(Dingman, 1995) found 
that their mean annual base salary was $111,000, although 
bonuses typically added another 25 percent to that amount. 
Survey respondents thought that the prospect of larger 
bonuses would motivate them to greater performance.
From the result of the survey, the proportion of GMs 
holding equity in their property was found rising from 
hardly any in 1992 survey to 13 in the 1995 survey. One- 
fifth of those managing a hotel with room rates between $101
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and $200 held stock, and one in ten GMs in hotels with rates 
above $200 did so, but none of the GMs managing hotels in 
the low-price category(under $100 room rate)held stock or 
stock options. Marriott is in third place of the lists of 
companies for which these GMs would prefer to work. It is 
because they offer managers stock options and profit 
sharing. The survey results show that there may be an 
intention to use ownership and stock option to motivate 
hotel managers for better performance in the high end of the 
hotel industry.
As the lodging industry continues to stabilize and 
recover from the downturn, relationships between managers 
and owners continue to be in flux with new patterns of 
ownership, finance and management emerging(Sheridan, 1995). 
Years ago, management got long-term, non-cancelable, full- 
free contracts. With the downturn, owners saw managers 
getting fees for running hotels, and expanding hotels supply 
blindly only for serving their own interests, with no money 
flowing to owners. They finally woke up and sought changes. 
According to Sheridan (1995), owners were looking for two 
things- profitability and asset appreciation. They wanted 
to make money, and they wanted their asset to increase in 
value. This was the new owners/managers relationship.
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Owners tried to reduce the agency cost and improve hotels 
performance. The classic 5% of gross management fee 
disappeared. Fees are now basically a smaller percentage of 
the gross and larger percentage of profit or improved 
profit. Today, management fees, depending on the size, can 
be 2% to 4% of the gross revenue, but they may m n  as much 
as 10% to 12% of net operating profit before debt service. 
Beyond those, some owners require management company have 
the ownership percentage to insure their acting for 
maximizing stockholders wealth.
In the new owner/manager relationship, hotels owners 
have been more active to monitor their agent-managers. This 
new agency relationship can align managers' interests to the 
owner's objective. For example, the days of ego-driven 
managers who load their properties with services and 
facilities, such as : expensive exotic flowers, that make 
guests happy but owners poorer are numbered(Sheridan, 1995). 
Managers' ownership along with performance-based 
compensation have been used by owners to force hotels 
managers to reduce cost and align their interests with those 
of owners.
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Summary
This chapter has given a wide literature support for my 
research questions. The first section of the literature 
review indicates the importance of aligning the interests of 
managers with those of owners, thus providing the basis of 
this study.
The second section of the literature review provides 
the support for my test hypotheses. The results from 
previous studies on managerial ownership/performance 
relationship have been mixed, inconclusive and inconsistent. 
Most of the previous studies have used data from 
manufacturing industries, rather than from service 
industries. Market and accounting measures have been 
alternately used, rather than being used together 
consistently. Further research to provide evidence form 
service industries with both market and accounting 
performance measures is therefore needed. In the last part 
of this section, hotel managers compensation and incentive 
surveys were reviewed. Those surveys' results imply that 
managerial ownership could be a tool for better aligning 
hotel managers' interests with those of owners and reduce 
agency conflicts in the lodging industry.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
Introduction
The objective of this study is to investigate the 
relationship between managers' ownership and performance in 
lodging industry. Findings of the study may enable the 
lodging industry to determine if increasing managers' 
ownership is an effective way to align interests of managers 
with that of stockholders. This chapter discusses the 
methodology used to investigate managerial ownership/ 
performance relationship. It is divided into four major 
sections :
1. Research hypotheses
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Research Hypotheses
Specific null hypotheses designed to answer the 
research questions raised in chapter 1 are presented below:
Hypothesis 1:
There is no relationship between managers' 
ownership and financial performance of hotels.
This null hypothesis is related to the first research 
question and a part of the second research question. To 
test the relationship between ownership and performance, 
size-adjusted managers' stock holding percentage will be 
used as a measure of managers' ownership. Measures of 
performance include five accounting ratios: return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), profit margin (PM), 
operating return(OR), return on investment (ROD, and a 
market ratio: return on stock(SR). The relationship between 
ownership and performance will be first tested for the 
lodging industry as a whole. Separate tests on the fast- 
growing casino hotel sector and slow-growing regular hotel 
sector will follow up. The following is a list of the sub-
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hypotheses testing each performance variable for hypothesis 
1 .
Sub-Hypotheses for H^:
There is no relationship between managers'
ownership and profit margin of hotels 
There is no relationship between managers'
ownership and return on assets of hotels.
Hi<c>: There is no relationship between managers'
ownership and return on equity of hotels.
H , : There is no relationship between managers'
ownership and return on investment of 
hotels.
: There is no relationship between managers'
ownership and operating return of hotels.
: There is no relationship between managers'
ownership and stock return of hotels.
Hypothesis 2 :
There is no difference on financial performance 
between hotels which have different levels of 
managers' ownership.
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This null hypothesis is designed to further answer the 
first research question. To test this hypothesis, hotels 
with same level of relative ownership percentages will be 
grouped together. Then the financial performance between 
each group will be compared to determine if any significant 
differences in performance exist.
The sub-hypotheses for each performance variable of 
hypothesis 2 are:
H2<a>= There is no difference on profit margin 
between hotels which have different 
managers' ownership levels.
H2cb. = There is no difference on return on assets 
between hotels which have different 
managers' ownership levels.
Hz.c, : There is no difference on return on equity 
between hotels which have different 
managers' ownership levels.
: There is no difference on return on 
investment between hotels which have 
different managers' ownership levels.
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: There is no difference on operating return 
between hotels which have different 
managers' ownership levels.
H;,., : There is no difference on stock return 
between hotels which have different 
managers' ownership levels.
Hypothesis 3 :
There is no significant difference on 5-year sales 
growth between regular hotels and casino hotels.
This null hypothesis is designed to answer the second 
research question. It is well known that the casino hotel 
sector has grown fast recently. The difference in growth 
between the regular and casino hotel sectors, however, needs 
to be tested before the regular hotel sector can be defined 
as the slow-growing sector, and the casino sector, the fast- 
growing sector of the lodging industry.
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Statistical Testing Methods
To test the hypotheses and answer the research 
questions proposed in Chapter 1, The SPSS statistical 
software package was used to conduct regression and perform 
Mann-Whitney and Kruskal Wallis tests.
The regression was used to test the first hypothesis. 
The result of this test would indicate if positive or 
negative relationship exists between the managers' ownership 
and the financial performance, and how strong this 
relationship is. The regression was also run separately 
for regular hotels and casino hotels to see if the 
managerial ownership/performance relationship would differ 
across the two different sectors, slow-growing hotels and 
fast-growing casinos.
Kruskal-Wallis test was used to test the second 
hypothesis. The result of this test would indicate whether 
or not the mean ranks of financial performance in different 
adjusted MOP groups are significantly different from one 
another. As some variables failed to show normal 
distribution, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, which 
requires no normal distribution, was utilized to test this 
hypothesis.
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The Mann-Whitney test was used to test the third 
hypothesis, the difference in growth between the two 
sectors. The Mann-Whitney test, a non-parametric substitute 
for the parametric t-test, is often used to test the 
difference between two groups. The Mann-Whitney test was 
used to test the third hypothesis because the data of the 
5-year sales growth of two sectors were not normally 
distributed. The result of the test will indicate if 
casino hotels can be treated as fast-growth sectors while 
the regular hotels can be treated as slow-growth sectors.
Data
This study concentrates on the lodging industry. All 
data were drawn from the lodging industry that includes 
regular and casino hotels.
The research is limited to publicly traded hotel, motel 
and casino firms which provide accommodation. The 
hotel/motel and casino hotel data were obtained from Compact 
Disclosure database. Some thinly traded small firms, which 
were not listed in the database, are not included in this 
study. The casino hotels are the firms with a primary SIC 
code of 7011(hotel and motel) and a secondary SIC code of 
7993 (coin-amusement), or the firms with a primary SIC code
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of 7993 and a secondary SIC code of 7011. The regular 
hotels are the firms with only one primary SIC code of 7011.
Stock return data were obtained from the Wall Street
Journal. Those hotels and casinos that are traded in non­
national systems are not included in this study due to the 
difficulty to get their data. Stock Return is defined as 
the percentage price change between Jan. 2, 1996 to Sep. 6, 
1996. The formula is :
R = (P, - Po)/P,
R = Stock Return
P, = Closing Price on Sep. 6, 1996 
Pq = Closing Price on Jan. 2, 1996
If a company pays dividend, then the formula is 
R = (Pi + D - Pa)/Po
D = dividend amount during the holding period
The final sample for this study includes 20 regular 
hotels and 25 casino hotels which have all the necessary 
data available. Tables 1 and 2 list the regular hotel firms 
and casino hotel firms used in this study.




Liât <?■£. Regular Hotels
1 Buckhead America Corp.
2 Sonesta International Hotels Corp.
3 Jameson Inns Inc.
4 Amerihost Properties Inc.
5 John Q Hammons Hotels Inc.
6 Kahler Realty Corp.
7 Studio Plus Hotels Inc.
8 Supertel Hospitality Inc.
9 Suburban Lodges Of America Inc.
10 Wyndham Hotel Corp.
11 Marriott International Inc.
12 Service Inc.
13 Bristol Hotel Corp.
14 Extended Stay America Inc.
15 Doubletree Corp.
16 Starwood Lodging Corp.
17 Sholodge Inc.
18 La Quinta Inns Inc.
19 Host Marriott Corp.















Black Hawk Gaming & Development 




Lady Luck Gaming Corp.
Gaylord Entertainment Corp. 
Hollywood Casino Corp.
Casino Magic Corp.
Harveys Casino Resorts 
Ameristar Casinos Inc.
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13 Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts
14 Rio Hotel & Casino Inc.
15 Aztar Corp.
16 Showboat Inc.
17 Station Casinos Inc.
18 Primadonna Resorts Inc.
19 Boyd Gaming Corp.
20 Bally Entertainment Corp.
21 MGM Grand Inc.
22 Mirage Resorts Inc.
23 Griffin Gaming & Entertainment
24 Circus Circus Enterprises Inc.
25 Hilton Hotels Corp.
Variables
The dependent variables in this study are the hotel 
performance ratios. For the purposes of this study, five 
profitability ratios, return on assets (ROA), operating 
return(OR), return on equity(ROE), total return to 
investors (ROD , and profit margin (PM) were used as 
accounting performance measures. Stock return (SR) was used 
as a market measure of performance. Different profitability 
ratios, reflecting return in different dimensions, were used 
in the study as performance measures. Return on assets 
(ROA), a ratio of net income to total assets, measures the 
return to the total financing provided by shareholders, 
long-term and short-term creditors. Return on investment 
(ROD, a ratio of net income to long-term debt, preferred 
equity and common equity, measures the return to capital or
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long-term and permanent financing. Return on equity (ROE), 
or net income divided by equity, is an indicator of the 
return to the owners or the shareholders of a lodging firm. 
Profit margin (PM), which is net income divided by net 
revenue, was also used. The ratio shows the return in terms 
of a lodging firms operation activity or sales, rather than 
in terms of financing activity. Operating return (OR) is 
defined as the ratio of operating cash flow to the operating 
assets of a lodging firm. This ratio excludes the effect of 
depreciation and interest expenses. Therefore, it can be a 
better measure of managerial performance in comparison with 
other profitability ratios. Further, excluding non- 
operational assets investments from the denominator and the 
impact of depreciation and interest expenses from the 
numerator makes the ratio a better reflection of operating 
results. Using multiple ratios will provide performance 
measures from different aspects of a lodging firm's 
activities.
In most of previous research on the relationship 
between managerial ownership and performance, the 
independent variable for regression was managers' ownership 
percentage. In a preliminary trial test of this study, the 
managers' ownership percentage (MOP) was first derived by
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dividing the shares held by officers or directors by the 
total number of outstanding shares. Managers' ownership 
percentage was regressed against different performance 
variables.
The preliminary test shows that there is no significant 
relationship between managerial ownership measured in 
percentage and firm performance relationship (Table 3). 
Figure 1 is a plot of managers' ownership versus operating 
return(OR).
Table 3
Preliminary Test of the Relationship between Original 









PM .246264 . 02654 .2793 No
OR .035080 .02563 .2379 No
RGI .030959 .00935 .5226 NO
ROE .098285 .01223 .3395 No
ROA .154988 .08017 .5541 NO
SR .247504 .14594 . 1574 NO




Figure 1 The Relationship Between Original Managers' 
Ownership and Hotels Operating Return
The scatter plot does not demonstrate a linear 
relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. Similarly, none of the other performance 
measures has shown any linear pattern when plotted against 
the managers' ownership measured by percentage.
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Table 4
Relationship between Original Managers' Ownership Percentage









PM .347519 . 09145 .1950 No
OR . 067071 .11270 .1479 No
ROI . 064976 .06592 .2745 No
ROE 2 . 053374 .34820 .1969 No
ROA . 014206 . 01109 .6586 No
SR -.254388 .06746 .2688 No
Table 5
Rglationgitip-J?.g.twegn Original Maxag.gXB' .Qwaerghip percentage









PM .260900 .02157 .4740 No
OR .007170 . 00088 . 8854 No
ROI .017745 . 00226 .8176 No
ROE .197794 .00414 .7548 No
ROA -.001534 .00005 . 9714 No
SR .430597 . 03830 . 3380 No
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The same preliminary test was also conducted for the 
regular hotel sector and the casino hotel sector 
respectively. Results from linear regression using MOP as 
the independent variable show there is no significant 
relationship between managers' ownership and performance 
(Table 4-5)in either regular hotels or casino hotels. The 
plots of MOP against other performance variables, like 
Figure 1, do not show any linear pattern.
Previous studies found the size of firms has an impact 
on the incentive that is created by the managers' ownership 
percentage. With the same ownership percentage, the bigger 
the company, the larger the incentive. Therefore, to 
investigate the ownership/performance relationship, the 
independent variable, MOP need to be adjusted for the size 
effect. In this study, to control for the impact of size, 
the original MOP was multiplied by size index to obtain the 
adjusted MOP.
The observed market value of the firm cannot be used as 
a size measure to derive the adjustment index because there 
are huge differences in the sizes of the sample firms.
Using observed market value to adjust ownership could 
enlarge the real size effect. For example, the biggest
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size is the 885 times of the smallest size, but the size 
effect on ownership cannot be 885 times. According to the 
theory of data transformation, for larger numbers it takes a 
great increase in X to produce a small increase in log X. 
Therefore, the logarithmic transformation has the effect of 
stretching small value of X and condensing large value of X 
(Clark,1984).
The logarithmic transformation of the observed market 
value can well serve the size adjustment need in this study. 
Thus the log to the base 10 of the size (called Lnsize) was 
selected for calculating the adjusted index. The company 
with the smallest Lnsize or logarithmic market value was 
identified as the benchmark. The size index was then 
created by dividing each company's Lnsize by the benchmark. 
Finally, the new independent variable, or the size-adjusted 
ownership percentage was obtained by multiplying the 
original MOP by the size index. The size-adjusted MOPs of 
the 45 sample firms are displayed in Table 6.
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Table 6
Compare Hotels' Management Ownership Percentage With 







CASINO RESOURCE CORP 0.42401 1.00000 0.424010
BUCKHEAD AMERICA CORP 0.1159 1.04334 0.120889
SONESTA INTERNATIONAL HOTELS C 0.64 1.07125 0.685598
BLACK HAWK GAMING & DEVELOPMEN 0.32382 1.08572 0.351576
MONARCH CASINO & RESORT INC 0.65320 1.12189 0.732818
JAMESON INNS INC 0.2033 1.12190 0.228104
PRATT HOTEL CORP 0.80767 1.12628 0.909664
BOOMTOWN INC 0.16753 1.13259 0.189746
AMERIHOST PROPERTIES INC 0.3184 1.14035 0.363121
PRESIDENT CASINOS INC 0.32474 1.14051 0.370368
JOHN Q HAMMONS HOTELS INC 0.4000 1.15989 0.463956
KAHLER REALTY CORP 0.1904 1.16228 0.221269
STUDIO PLUS HOTELS INC 0.1882 1.18566 0.223162
SUPERTEL HOSPITALITY INC 0.32 1.18990 0.380768
LADY LUCK GAMING CORP 0.46266 1.19399 0.552416
GAYLORD ENTERTAINMENT CO 0.63 1.19746 0.754398
HOLLYWOOD CASINO CORP 0.51682 1.21791 0.629434
CASINO MAGIC CORP 0.32502 1.22669 0.398693
HARVEYS CASINO RESORTS 0.48975 1.22839 0.601601
AMERISTAR CASINOS INC 0.87313 1.24638 1.088256
SUBURBAN LODGES OF AMERICA INC 0.8002 1.24898 0.999386
TRUMP HOTELS & CASINO RESORTS 0.66988 1.25156 0.838401
RIO HOTEL & CASINO INC 0.26062 1.25970 0.328302
WYNDHAM HOTEL CORP 0.8829 1.26648 1.118146
AZTAR CORP 0.05701 1.27920 0.072928
SHOWBOAT INC 0.16300 1.28421 0.209326
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC 0.1851 1.28644 0.238158
STATION CASINOS INC 0.42415 1.28821 0.546396
SERVICO INC 0.0827 1.28942 0.106614
BRISTOL HOTEL CO 0.1328 1.29201 0.171583
PRIMADONNA RESORTS INC 0.39510 1.30885 0.517129
EXTENDED STAY AMERICA INC 0.5237 1.31068 0.686341
DOUBLETREE CORP 0.1349 1.31625 0.177575
BOYD GAMING CORP 0.59375 1.32187 0.78486
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STARWOOD LODGING CORP 0.17 1.33199 0.226438
BALLY ENTERTAINMENT CORP 0.16800 1.35008 0.226813
SHOLODGE INC 0.4054 1.35881 0.550906
LA QUINTA INNS INC 0.1580 1.36691 0.215915
MGM GRAND INC 0.73000 1.37502 1.003761
MIRAGE RESORTS INC 0.18900 1.38952 0.262619
HOST MARRIOTT CORP 0.1142 1.39141 0.158914
GRIFFIN GAMING & ENTERTAINMENT 0.37480 1.40033 0.524845
CIRCUS CIRCUS ENTERPRISES INC 0.19000 1.42460 0.270674
HILTON HOTELS CORP 0.25269 1.44134 0.36421
RENAISSANCE HOTEL GROUP N V 0.61 1.45559 0.887908
Same size adjustments are done separately for regular 
and casino hotels. The size-adjusted MOPs for these two 
sectors are displayed in table 7 and Table 8.
Table 7
Compare Casino Hotels' Méuiagement Ownership Percentage 







CASINO RESOURCE CORP 0.42401 1.000000 0.424010
BLACK HAWK GAMING & DEVELOPMENT 0.32382 1.080068 0.349747
MONARCH CASINO & RESORT INC 0.65320 1.116051 0.729005
PRATT HOTEL CORP 0.80767 1.120423 0.904931
BOOMTOWN INC 0.16753 1.126693 0.188759
PRESIDENT CASINOS INC 0.32474 1.134580 0.368441
LADY LUCK GAMING CORP 0.46266 1.187783 0.549542
GAYLORD ENTERTAINMENT CO 0.63 1.191228 0.750473
HOLLYWOOD CASINO CORP 0.51682 1.211572 0.626159
CASINO MAGIC CORP 0.32502 1.220306 0.396619
HARVEYS CASINO RESORTS 0.48975 1.221996 0.598471
AMERISTAR CASINOS INC 0.87313 1.239895 1.082594
TRUMP HOTELS & CASINO RESORTS 0.66988 1.245049 0.834039
RIO HOTEL & CASINO INC 0.26062 1.253143 0.326594
AZTAR CORP 0.05701 1.272547 0.072549
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SHOWBOAT INC 0.16300 1.277525 0.208237
STATION CASINOS INC 0.42415 1.281511 0.543553
PRIMADONNA RESORTS INC 0.39510 1.302043 0.514439
BOYD GAMING CORP 0.59375 1.314990 0.780777
BALLY ENTERTAINMENT CORP 0.16800 1.343053 0.225633
MGM GRAND INC 0.73000 1.367861 0.998539
MIRAGE RESORTS INC 0.18900 1.382288 0.261252
GRIFFIN GAMING & ENTERTAINMENT 0.37480 1.393049 0.522115
CIRCUS CIRCUS ENTERPRISES INC 0.19000 1.417187 0.269265
HILTON HOTELS CORP 0.25269 1.433836 0.362315
Table 8
Compare Regular Hotels' Management Ownership Percentage 







BUCKHEAD AMERICA CORP 0.1159 1.0000 0.1159
SONESTA INTERNATIONAL HOTELS 0.64 1.0268 0.6571
JAMESON INNS INC 0.2033 1.0753 0.2186
AMERIHOST PROPERTIES INC 0.3184 1.0930 0.3480
JOHN Q HAMMONS HOTELS INC 0.4000 1.1117 0.4447
KAHLER REALTY CORP 0.1904 1.1140 0.2121
STUDIO PLUS HOTELS INC 0.1882 1.1364 0.2139
SUPERTEL HOSPITALITY INC 0.32 1.1405 0.3650
SUBURBAN LODGES OF AMERICA INC 0.8002 1.1971 0.9579
WYNDHAM HOTEL CORP 0.8829 1.2139 1.0717
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC 0.1851 1.2330 0.2283
SERVICO INC 0.0827 1.2359 0.1022
BRISTOL HOTEL CO 0.1328 1.2383 0.1645
EXTENDED STAY AMERICA INC 0.5237 1.2562 0.6578
DOUBLETREE CORP 0.1349 1.2616 0.1702
STARWOOD LODGING CORP 0.17 1.2767 0.2170
SHOLODGE INC 0.4054 1.3024 0.5280
LA QUINTA INNS INC 0.1580 1.3101 0.2069
HOST MARRIOTT CORP 0.1142 1.3336 0.1523
RENAISSANCE HOTEL GROUP N V 0.61 1.3951 0.8510
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The smallest index is one, for the smallest company, 
casino Resources corporate itself. As the indexes of other 
companies are larger than one. The size adjusted MOPs of 
the companies are all greater than the original MOP. 
Choosing the smallest Lnsize as the benchmark is pure 
personal preference. The median and the largest Lnsize can 
also be chosen as the benchmark without affecting the 
results.
Previous studies created different groups for firms 
with different size ranges, then regression was conducted 
for different size groups. In this study, regression for 
different size groups are not appropriate because of the 
small sample size.
Summary
In this chapter, the data and research methodology for 
this study have been discussed. The selection of the 
dependent variables, performance, and the independent 
variable, adjusted MOP, have been presented. The results of 
statistical testing will be presented in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND F IN D IN G S
Introduction
In chapter 3, the methodology and procedures for data 
selection and data analysis have been discussed. In this 
chapter, an overview of the mean financial performances of 
the lodging industry is first presented before the results 
of the statistical testing are discussed.
Overview of Performance
The descriptive statistics of the financial 
performances of the lodging industry as a whole, and the two 
sub-groups of hotel and casino sectors are shown in Tables 
9-11. A comparison of Table 10 and Table 11 shows that 
hotels outperformed casinos on ROA, ROI and ROE, while 
casinos outperformed hotels on SR and PM based on the mean 
values.
59
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Table 9
Descriptive Statistics of Performance Measures
for all Hotels
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum N
ROA . 03 . 04 - .05 . 09 45
ROI . 04 .05 - . 05 .23 45
OR .09 . 04 -. 01 .19 45
SR .16 .32 -.27 1.42 45
ROE . 13 .27 - .42 1.37 45
PM .43 . 14 . 05 . 79 45
Table 10
P.gAgrJ,ptiy-e. St.a.tistigs of. PerfprmansÆ. Heagures 
£gj Regular. Hotelg
measure Mean std Dev Minimum Maximum
SR .06 .08 - .10 .20
ROA .04 .03 - . 04 .09
ROI .06 .06 - .05 .23
OR .09 .05 - .01 .19
ROE .20 .39 - .42 1.37
PM .42 .20 .05 .79
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Table 11
Descriptive Statistics of Performance Measures 
for Casino Hotels
measure Mean Std Dev Minimum Méiximum
SR .22 .35 - .27 1.42
ROA . 02 .04 - .05 .08
ROI . 02 .04 - . 03 .09
OR . 09 .03 .05 .12
ROE .07 .07 - .05 .17
PM .44 .06 .32 .60
Test Results
Hypothesis 1
The purpose of this hypothesis was to examine the 
relationship between managers' ownership and performance of 
lodging firms. Results from linear regression which used the 
size adjusted MOP as the independent variable were presented 
in Table 10. From the linear regression, the results show 
positive linear relationship between managers' ownership 
and three of the six measures of performance. The null
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hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between 
managers' ownership and performance is rejected for half of 
the performance measures with a significant level of 0.05 
level. Table 12 demonstrates the regression results.
Table 12 
Relationship Between Adjusted Managers' Ownership Percentage 











PM .303838 .39982 . 0000 YES*
OR .057639 .19486 .0024 YES*
ROI . 041798 .05582 .1182 NO
ROE .422057 .20802 .0016 YES*
ROA .006935 .00290 .7255 NO
SR .203024 .03338 .2297 NO
* significant at 0.05 level
The relationship between ownership and profit margin of 
hotels is significant at extremely high significant 
level(F=0.0000). Figure 2 demonstrates a positive linear 
relationship between the two variables. Therefore null sub­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
hypothesis h^ g^, that there is no relationship between 
managers' ownership and profit margin of hotels is strongly 
rejected.
Same positive linear relationship is shown between 
adjusted MOP and operating return, and between managers' 
ownership and return on equity at the 0.05 significant 
level. When adjusted MOP is plotted against performance 
variables, a linear pattern is obvious (see Figure 3-4). 
Therefore the null sub-hypotheses are rejected.
The relationships between managers' ownership and other 
measures of performance: return on assets, return on 
investment and stock return are not significant at the 0.05 
level. Their plots do not suggest a linear pattern (see 
Figure 5-7) . Therefore, null sub-hypotheses 
are accepted.





Figure 2 : Scatter Plot for Relationship between Adjusted 
Managers' Ownership and Hotels Profit Margin.
0.0 .2 
REL.MOP
Figure 3: Scatter Plot For Relationship Between Adjusted 
Managers' Ownership And Hotels Operating Return







Figure 4: Scatter Plot for Relationship between Adjusted 












Figure 5; Scatter Plot for Relationship between Adjusted 
Managers' Ownership and Hotels Return on Assets




Figure 6: Scatter Plot for Relationship between Adjusted 
Managers' Ownership And Hotels Return on
Investment
0 0-REL.^O P  
REL.MOP
i.u 1.Ü
Figure 7; Scatter Plot for Relationship between Adjusted 
Managers' Ownership and Hotels Stock Return
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The regression was further conducted for the regular 
hotel sector and the casino hotel sector separately.
Results show that there is significant relationship between 
the adjusted MOP and some performance measures (Table 13- 
14). Some are significant at the 0.05 level, such as PM (in 
regular hotels and in casino hotels), OR(in regular hotels), 
ROE(in regular hotels). Some are significant at the 0.1 
level, such as ROI (in regular hotels), OR(in casino hotels) 
and ROE(in casino hotels).
Table 13
Relationship between Adjusted Managers' Ownership Percentage











PM .478410 .51030 .0004 Yes*
OR .092861 .30768 .0111 Yes*
ROI .074054 .14384 .0991 Yes**
ROE .885969 .45728 . 0011 Yes*
ROA .017944 .03138 .4550 No
SR .033525 . 01435 .6150 No
* significant at 0.05 level ** significant at 0.1 level
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Table 14
Relationship between Adjusted Managers' Ownership Percentage











PM .147889 .38868 . 0009 Yes*
OP . 033004 .12468 . 0834 Yes**
ROI . 044547 .10820 .1084 no
ROE . 098601 .13924 . 0662 Yes**
ROA . 009200 .00371 .7723 no
SR .274797 .07487 .1857 no
* significant at 0.05 level ** significant at 0.1 level
The relationship between the adjusted MOP and profit 
margin is highly significant in both regular hotels and 
casino hotels (at the 0.05 level). The relationship between 
the adjusted MOP and return on equity is significant at the 
0.05 level in regular hotels, and at the 0.1 level in casino 
hotels. The relationship between the adjusted MOP and 
operating return is significant at 0.05 level in regular 
hotels, and at 0.1 level in casino hotels. The relationship 
between the adjusted MOP and return on investment is 
marginally significant for regular hotels(at the 0.1 level).
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but slightly below the 0.1 level for casino hotels. The 
relationship between the adjusted MOP and ROA is not 
significant in either regular or casino hotel groups. 
Likewise the relationship between the adjusted MOP and stock 
return is not significant in either regular or casino 
hotels.
The regression results show that there are some 
differences in the managerial ownership/performance 
relationship between regular hotels and casino hotels. The 
ownership/performance relationship is found to be more 
significant for regular hotels than for casino hotels in 
terms of statistical significant level, the adjusted MOP 
coefficients and the R^s.
Hypothesis 2;
This hypothesis was developed to examine the 
performance differences between hotels which have different 
ownership percentage levels. The non-paramatric Kruskal- 
Wallis one way Anova test was used because of the small 
sample size and non-normal distribution of data.
The 45 hotels were divided into 3 sub groups. Firms 
which have adjusted MOP at 33.3% or below were classified 
into group 1. Those with 34%-66% adjusted MOP were
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classified into group 2, and those with above 67% adjusted 
MOP into group 3.
The test results were presented in Table 15. The 
results show that profit margin and operating return have 
significant differences between different groups at the 0.05 
and the 0.1 significant levels respectively. So the null 
sub-hypotheses Hj.a, and are rejected for these two
performance ratios.
Table 15
Kruskal-Wallis 1-wav ANOVA Test for _Testing Performance
Differences in Hotels which have Different Ownership Levels.











PM 15.39 22 . 53 35 . 00 .0003 YES*
ROA 24 .31 21.23 23.25 .7952 NO
ROE 20.83 21.60 28 . 00 .3006 NO
ROI 22.94 19.67 27.25 .3266 NO
OR 18.56 23.30 29.29 .0894 YES**
SR 23.19 24.47 20.88 .7766 NO
* significant at 0.05 level ** significant at 0.1 level
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Other measures of performance, return on assets, return 
on equity, return on investment and stock return have not 
shown any significant differences, so those null sub­
hypotheses Hz.c., Hj.d, and are accepted.
As the cut off point for grouping may affect the real 
difference between groups, different cut off percentages 
were tried in the Kruskal-Wallis test. The results were 
similar.
Hypothesis 3
The purpose of testing Hypothesis 3 is to examine the 
difference in the growth between the two sectors, i.e. 
regular hotels and casino hotels. The test result is 
presented in Table 14. The result shows that there is a 
significant difference in sales growth between the regular 
and casino hotel sector at the 0.1 significant level. 
Therefore the null hypothesis Hj of no difference in growth 
is rejected. The casino hotel sector is really a fast- 
growth sector while regular hotels can be regarded as a slow 
growth sector of the lodging industry.
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Table 16
Mann-Whitney—test f<?r .5-years salgg .growth-diffgrgngg 
between regular hotels and casino hotels.
Mean Rank cases
16.88 17 variable 1= regular hotels
23 .17 23 variable 2 = casino hotels
corrected for ties
U Z 2-Tailed P
134.0 -1.6831 .0924*
* significant at 0.1 level
Summary and Discussion of Findings
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, this 
study intends to investigate if there is a significant 
relationship between managers' ownership and 
hotels'/casinos' performance and how performance is related 
to managers' ownership. Further, it intends to find out if 
there is significant performance difference between firms 
with different MOP levels. Second, this study examines if 
the managers' ownership/performance relationship differs 
across the slow-growing hotel sector and the fast-growing 
casino hotel sector.
In the linear regression, the test rejected three of 
six of the null sub-hypotheses of the tested performance 
measures. The null hypotheses of ROI ratio was barely
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rejected at the 0.1 level. In particular, the three 
performance measures with Ho rejected at high significance 
level, ROE, PM, and OR, are ratios more relevant to 
shareholders, or more operational and managerial in nature. 
Therefore, the linear regression results lean towards the 
rejection of the null hypothesis.
The manager's ownership has the positive linear 
relationship with most of the performance measures since the 
coefficients of adjusted MOP are all positive. Increasing 
managers' ownership seems a way to better converge the 
interests of managers and stockholders. Increasing managers' 
ownership can improve hotels' profit margin, operating 
return, and return on equity in particular.
In the linear regression, the performance measures of 
ROA and ROI were not found having significant relationship 
with MOP. The test results reveal a pattern that shows when 
the ratio becomes more relevant to equity owners or the 
shareholders, the relationship is more significant. Table 
15 is a comparison of the test results of ROE, ROI and ROA 
for the lodging industry as a whole. The ROA ratio is a 
ratio of net income to total assets or total financing which 
includes financing provided by shareholders and by both 
short- and long-term creditors. When ROA was reduced to ROI
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with the short-term liabilities removed from the 
denominator, the relationship between MOP and performance 
became barely significant. When ROI was further reduced to 
ROE with the removal of all liabilities from the 
denominator, the relationship between the MOP and 
performance becomes highly significant. The same pattern 
appears in the linear regression results of the two sectors 
(see Tables 11 and 12). This pattern strongly suggests that 
MOP can better converge the interests of management and the 
shareholders, rather than the interests of management and 
those of shareholders and creditors combined.
Table 17
Comparing relationship JsLg.tws.en. reJAtivg. gyngrship and 
three meaguc.es .<}£. perf ormanoo
Dependent
Variable
Financing Provider in 





ROA all financing providers .00290 .7255
ROI long-term creditors 
and shareholders
. 05582 . 1182
ROE Shareholders .20802 . 0016*
* significant at 0.05 level
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The stock return was found not significantly related to 
the ownership. This finding is consistent with the findings 
of Tsetsekos and DeFusco's study (1990) . There are two 
possible reasons for the insignificant relationship. First, 
the market factors may have distorted the results. Stock 
prices are very sensitive to external events that may have 
little to do with how efficiently a hotel is run and that 
are totally beyond management's control(Deckop,1987) .
Second, the time frame of the performance ratios may be too 
short to cause market reaction. The stock price measures 
indicate what investors think of a company's past 
performance and future prospects(Brigham, 1985). Probably a 
quarter's performance is not sufficient to cause significant 
reaction from the market.
The Kruskal-Wallis one way Anova test shows that PM and 
OR at different managers' ownership level differ 
significantly. This finding is consistent with the linear 
regression results. ROE was not significant in the test.
A possible reason may be the non-parametic method itself.
The advantage of the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test is 
that it requires fewer assumptions than other tests. The 
disadvantage is that it is less powerful or less sensitive 
in finding differences when they exist in the population
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(Norusis,1995). Therefore, using non-parametric tests may 
fail to display some important differences.
The empirical result of Kesner (1987) indicated that, 
for low-growth industries, managers' stock ownership did not 
appear to influence either current or future performance. 
Alternatively, high-growth industries did reveal a positive 
and significant relationship between stock ownership of the 
board and performance. In this study, regressions were 
performed separately for the slow-growing hotel sector and 
fast-growing casino sector. The finding is quite different 
from Kesner's result (1987). A comparison between Table 13 
and 14 show that the slow-growing hotel sector obtained even 
higher statistical significance levels in the test of the 
relationship between adjusted MOP and performances (PM, OR, 
ROE and ROI). The higher significance level associated with 
the regular hotels' tests suggest that there is a stronger 
relationship between MOP and performance in the slow-growing 
hotel sector than in the fast-growing casino hotel sector. 
Increasing MOP may be a more effective tool for regular 
hotels to improve performance. There are two reasons that 
may explain the findings. First, in casino hotels the major 
part of profits comes from gambling operation rather than 
from lodging or food and beverage operations. There are more
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other factors that may have influence on casino hotels' 
performance than on regular hotels', such as high rollers' 
winning or losing, gaming legalization in other states, 
merger and consolidation of large gaming companies, etc. 
Those other factors may have distorted the fast-growing 
casino hotel sector's MOP/performance relationship. Second, 
the data used for this study is from 1995-1996. Since later 
1995, the regular hotel sector has been booming. Room 
occupancy has achieved the highest level since 1989. 
Therefore, this "slow-growing" sector may be experiencing a 
fast growth phase recently. On the other hand, the rapid 
expansion of the casino hotels has recently slowed because 
of market saturation, particularly in emerging markets. 
Therefore, the regular hotel may be relatively fast-growing 
as compared with the casino hotels in the 1995-96 period.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUTIONS  
This chapter summarizes the findings of the study and 
makes some conclusions based on the empirical findings. 
Limitations of the study and recommendations for further 
research are also discussed.
Summary
To answer the first research question, linear 
regression was used to investigate the relationship between 
managers ownership and lodging firms' performance. After 
the adjustment for size effect, the results revealed that 
management ownership had a significant relationship with 
sample firms' performance in terms of operational and 
managerial activities and shareholder's relevance, such as 
profit margin, hotels operating return and hotels return on 
equity. Performances measured by those ratios are 
positively and linearly related to managers' ownership. 
Kruskal-Wallis test was further used to look for performance 
differences between different ownership levels. The results 
of profit margin and operating return did show significant 
difference between different groups. To answer the second
78
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research question, two separate regressions were performed. 
The results indicated that managers' ownership may be a more 
effective tool in interests alignment for regular hotels 
than for casino hotels.
Conclusions
In this study, significant relationship between MOP and 
performance measures that are operational, managerial and 
shareholder-relevant has been found. The findings have 
provided an important empirical evidence for the agency 
theory from a service industry. The results are consistent 
with those of Kim, Lee, and Francis (1988), and Hudson, 
Jahera and Lloyd (1992). Managers' ownership in the lodging 
industry could provide managers with long-term incentive, 
could better align their interests with shareholders', 
reduce agency cost, and therefore enhance hotels 
performance. The MOP may be more effective for the regular 
hotels to improve performance. The lodging industry may use 
ESOPs with an emphasize on managerial ownership as a tool to 
improve regular hotels performance in its continuing 
recovery.
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Limitations of the Study
This study did not control other factors which could 
effect the ownership/performance relationship in lodging 
industry, particularly in casino hotel sector.
This study considers hotel performance only in a short 
time frame. Which means that MOP effect on performance may 
not be fully displayed and that the market may not react 
quickly enough to the performance change.
Recommendations for Future Research
(1) In order to overcome the small sample size 
limitation, future research should use other databases to 
obtain a larger sample size. A larger sample size could 
provide more reliable results that can be generalized to the 
whole industry.
(2) In further research, the financial performance 
should be examined for a longer time horizon instead of 
three months.
(3) Debt use could have an impact on managers' 
ownership and on stock return. Future study can use debt 
ratio as another independent variable to investigate the 
relationship.
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(4) Future study can separate the management companies 
from the holding companies and further investigate the 
effect of different business types on the MOP/performance 
relationship.
(5) This study is focused on the lodging industry. 
There are a lot of managers' ownership practice in other 
service industries. The restaurant industry, for example, 
has large MOP but few of restaurant firms are successful. 
Further studies can extend the investigation into other 
hospitality industries, such as food service industry and 
non-gaming entertainment industry for more evidence from 
service industries.
(6) Future research can investigate the relationship 
between managers' ownership and performance for hospitality 
firms at different corporation development stages.
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